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Sergi Pardos-Prado, Merton College, University of Oxford
Iñaki Sagarzazu, Texas Tech UniversityUnderstanding the drivers of party issue emphasis and the specific role of public opinion is important to shed light on the
mechanisms of contemporary party competition and to assess the quality of representation in liberal democracies. Previous
research has produced conflicting results between issue ownership and issue dialogue perspectives and has ignored the
role of time in party communication strategy. We present a theory focused on the economy in which proximity to election
day increases the incumbent’s cost of not responding to opponent attacks and subsequently decreases the incumbent’s
attention to public opinion. We validate the main empirical implications of the model via content analysis of party discourse
in Spanish parliamentary speeches (1996–2011) and time series analyses. Our results have pessimistic implications for
an ideal conception of bottom-up representation. As electoral accountability pressures increase over the electoral cycle,
endogenous party competition overshadows public opinion as a driver of representatives’ agenda.nderstanding the determinants of parties’ issue em-
phasis has important implications for the quality of
representation in liberal democracies, especially at a
time of increasing political disaffection, populist success, and
an apparent disconnect between mainstream elites and sub-
stantial sectors of the public. The drivers of party discourse
and their implications for representation have been studied
from a variety of angles. Two approaches, however, stand out
as the core of such studies. The issue ownership approach is
one of the most prominent perspectives, which expect parties
to highlight the issues that either benefit them or harm their
competitors (Petrocik 1996; Vavreck 2007). However, the em-
pirical evidence of this claim has been contested by an alter-
native issue dialogue approach, in light of increasing conver-
gence in party communication strategies both in the United
States and in multiparty systems (see, e.g., Green-Pedersen and
Mortensen 2014; Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006; Sagarzazu
and Klüver 2017). Among the reasons why parties do not al-
ways highlight issues that should theoretically benefit them,
some scholars argue for the responsiveness of parties to public
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In this article we argue that the electoral cycle is a deci-
sive determinant of party issue emphasis that helps to un-
derstand some of the contradictions between issue owner-
ship and issue dialogue perspectives and the link between
public opinion and party agendas. Despite the importance of
previous contributions, the conditioning effect of the timing
of party messaging strategies usually has been disregarded.
The literature on party messaging and issue competition has
typically focused on the campaign period (e.g., Kaplan et al.
2006; Petrocik 1996; Spoon and Klüver 2015). Wherever longer
time periods have been analyzed (Green-Pedersen and Mor-
tensen 2014), the role of the electoral cycle has been under-
theorized and has not been specifically tested. This seems like
a pressing research gap, especially given that timing within
the electoral cycle has recently been suggested to be impor-
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2016).
We present a theoretical model focusing on the issue of the
economy, in which proximity to election day increases the
incumbent’s cost of not responding to opponents’ attacks and
the risk of competitors gaining issue ownership. While our
focus on the economy may or may not be applicable to other
issues with more static patterns of ownership, the economy
has been considered as representative in previous influential
work in the party-centered literature on issue ownership (Va-
vreck 2007). Moreover, recent work on issue dialogue increas-
ingly documents patterns of engagement across a variety of
issues for which our hypothesized mechanisms could be per-
fectly applicable. One of the novel implications of our model
is that, under certain conditions of party reputation, it is more
beneficial for parties to engage in issue dialogue with their
competitors close to election day, at the cost of ignoring pub-
lic opinion. In order to test the conditioning effect of the elec-
toral cycle on economic issue competition strategies, we use a
novel data set of party attention to economic issues in Spain
(1996–2011) measured at the month level, together with ob-
jective macroeconomic indicators and survey data on indi-
vidual economic perceptions.
Our findings have two important implications for the lit-
erature on issue competition and for understanding contem-
porary political representation. First, we confirm the impor-
tance of focusing on government opposition dynamics when
analyzing policy representation (Seeberg 2013; Thesen 2013)
and show that the electoral cycle strongly affects the incen-
tives of the governing party to respond to the messages of its
main competitor. This conditional effect sheds some light on
previous controversies between issue ownership and issue
dialogue theories. Both types of theory seem to be correct con-
ditional on time and on whether parties are in or out of power.
While opposition parties tend to only follow issue ownership
strategies, incumbent parties can follow both. At the begin-
ning of the cycle incumbent parties tend to be freer to artic-
ulate their economic communication strategy, whereas toward
the end of the cycle the pressure to respond to attacks and
prevent opposition ownership of the economy is much higher.
Second, the role of public opinion in driving party issue
attention seems to be far from the idealistic bottom-up con-
ception of democratic representation. Opposition parties tend
to highlight economic issues only on the basis of indirect short-
term reactions to bad macroeconomic conditions that are am-
plified by the media, while incumbent parties tend to be highly
responsive to public opinion only at the beginning of the elec-
toral cycle. As election day approaches, the dynamics of en-
dogenous party competition overshadow the role of public
opinion in setting the agenda of representatives.ISSUE COMPETITION IN PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKING
The selective choice of which issues to raise is an important
part of a political party’s competition strategy. Most of the
literature on party issue emphasis has focused on campaigns
or election-specific documents like party manifestos or plat-
forms (Budge and Laver 1993; Petrocik 1996; Robertson 1976).
However, our theory precisely focuses on the interelection
period. This is why we rely on an emerging perspective on
issue emphasis in parliamentary speaking (Chaqués-Bonafont,
Palau, and Baumgartner 2014). Recent research compellingly
shows that parliamentary questions and answers are a good
proxy for party issue attention and are highly correlated with
other communication sources like the media (Christiansen
and Seeberg 2016). This suggests that parliamentary speaking
is not simply a mechanical or strategic set of interactions dif-
ferent from messages targeted to public opinion.
While some work on parliamentary debates argues that the
use of these speeches is less electoral and more policy related
(Maltzman and Sigelman 1996), recent work on parliamen-
tary settings has found that these strategic dynamics that were
originally thought to be limited to campaigns also extend to
the choices of issues by parties on the floor of parliaments
(see, e.g., Martin and Vanberg 2008; Slapin and Proksch 2014;
Van Aelst and Vliegenthart 2014; Vliegenthart and Walgrave
2011; Vliegenthart et al. 2016), even if these are constrained
to the type of control that the party leadership can have on
members of parliament (Slapin and Proksch 2014). However,
our interest is more on the aggregate dynamics of party issue
attention rather than the control over who speaks. In this
sense, we follow the policy agenda-setting perspective that fo-
cuses on the overall priority of issues under discussion (Green-
Pedersen and Walgrave 2014).
Specifically, we are interested in the broad dynamics that
make parties talk about the economy, which is a paradigmatic
issue with important electoral consequences (Duch and Ste-
venson 2008; van der Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007).
Two intuitive theoretical perspectives have suggested contra-
dictory predictions: issue ownership and issue dialogue. Issue
ownership theory has been used to understand both voting
behavior and party strategy. In this article we are interested in
the latter. Issue ownership theory argues that parties can ef-
fectively own issues for which they have a higher reputation
and that parties have incentives to talk about those issues and
not others (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Petrocik 1996; Simon
2002).
As a performance issue, the economy relates directly to the
incumbent government benefiting it in good times and being
harmful in bad ones (Petrocik 1996; Vavreck 2009). Even if
not contradictory with it, this departs from the interpretation
of issue ownership as voters’ perceptions of a party’s reputa-
1. For a comprehensive review, see Walgrave, Soroka, and Nuytemans
(2008) and Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006).
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behavior studies tends to view issue ownership. Some of these
studies have shown that while perceptions of party compe-
tence exist, they can interact with the effects of performance
(Bélanger and Nadeau 2014, 2015; Egan 2013). The literature
using parties as units of analysis assumes a direct link between
good macroeconomic conditions and positive perceptions of
incumbent party competence among the public. On the basis
of this conception of the economy as a performance issue and
the fact that candidates still need to prime the economy for it
to become salient (Austin 2013), we would expect that the
incumbent will raise the issue in good economic times and
ignore it when the economy is performing badly. In the latter
scenario, the opposition party is instead the one that benefits
from raising the issue (Vavreck 2009).
New research has challenged some of the strong assump-
tions underlying the models of issue competition described
above (Williams, Seki, and Whitten 2015) and has focused on
the degree to which parties speak on the same issues (Sigel-
man and Buell 2004). There are different theoretical reasons
as to why issue dialogue would be expected. Among these, we
find appearing responsive to the public, responding to a rival
party, or following the media (see, e.g., Green-Pedersen and
Mortensen 2014; Kaplan et al. 2006; Sagarzazu and Klüver
2017; Sigelman and Buell 2004; Simon 2002).
When parties follow the public to appear responsive, we
say they “ride the wave” of public opinion (Ansolabehere and
Iyengar 1994; Sides 2006; Sigelman and Buell 2004). In this
model of dynamic agenda representation, if the priorities of
the public change then the priorities of those in government
should likewise change. If this happens, we should see a shift
in the attention that politicians pay to different issues (Bevan
and Jennings 2014). In this theoretical framework, the ulti-
mate objective is to be seen as concerned, responsive, and in-
formed (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994, 337). Recent research
has found that parties do consider the public’s preferences
when drafting their election platforms (Spoon and Klüver
2015), in their press releases (Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016), and
in their governing agendas (Green and Jennings 2017a). This
shows that parties listen to citizens when developing their
messaging. As the importance of economic issues increases for
the electorate, so too should the attention that is paid to it by
all parties.
Other research has argued that under certain circumstances
parties will be pushed to respond to their rivals’ discourse.
This set of contributions finds evidence of candidates tres-
passing on issues where their ownership is weak (Arceneaux
2008), politicians obfuscating hurtful issues to lessen their
impact (Alvarez 1997; Sides 2006), elected officials taking up
opponents’ campaign issues (Sulkin 2005), and candidatesengaged in close races engaging in more dialogue (Kaplan
et al. 2006). Alternatively, media and political science schol-
ars have argued about the role that media plays in setting the
agenda of political parties. While some have suggested that
the media exerts a great deal of influence (Baumgartner, Jones,
and Leech 1997; Chaqués-Bonafont and Baumgartner 2013;
Soroka 2002), others find little to no impact (Wanta and
Foote 1994).1
THE CONDITIONING EFFECT OF THE
ELECTORAL CYCLE
Theoretical intuition
In this section we develop a theoretical model incorporating
the role of the electoral cycle explaining party issue attention.
This model builds on issue ownership theory, which expects
the electoral success of a given party to be a function of its
competence on a given issue and the saliency of that issue in
public opinion. We rely on this conventional model of elec-
toral competition to derive our quantity of interest, namely,
party attention on the economy, which will be our dependent
variable in the analysis section.
Our main contribution is the parametrization of an elec-
toral cycle component that strengthens the influence of com-
petence and saliency as election day comes closer. The main
assumption behind this model is that parties expect voters to
be myopic and to take into account the most recent parties’
performance when casting their ballots. Voter myopia has
been a core assumption in many economic voting studies
(Bartels 2008), even if it has also been suggested that voters
are not myopic but rather misinformed (Hellwig and Mari-
nova 2014). Regardless of whether voters are actually myopic,
our assumption is that parties expect them to be so. In sum,
we expect parties to believe that campaigns matter in inform-
ing and persuading voters (Gelman and King 1993; Popkin
1991).
In the context of competition between office-seeking par-
ties who want to look particularly good at election time, parties
are likely to perceive the consequences of not responding to
an opponent’s attack as particularly dangerous toward the end
of the electoral cycle. Similarly, it is reasonable for parties to
think that boosting their own reputation and framing com-
petitors as incompetent can be particularly beneficial when
voters are paying more attention to political issues and mak-
ing up their minds before a vote. In other words, we expect
office-seeking parties to believe that the risk of voters being
persuaded of a bad performance and of the opponent increas-
ing issue ownership can be more consequential close to an
444 / Economic Responsiveness and the Electoral Cycle Sergi Pardos-Prado and Iñaki Sagarzazuelection (Williams 2013). The main result is thus that parties
engage in dialogue more at the end of the cycle, when the
marginal electoral gain or loss of controlling the agenda is
greater. Subsequently, since the capacity of the agenda is lim-
ited, the attention to other factors like public opinion will
necessarily decrease once parties engage in direct dialogue.2. For example, a given party may have been seen to be incompetent on
certain issues (say, foreign relations), but its power to attract voters on that
issue was arguably increasing in its number of media appearances. And had it
been perceived as being competent, its power to attract would have been even
higher had it done the same number of media appearances.Assumptions
Suppose there are two political parties, 1 (in opposition) and
2 (in government), and that there are two issues, a (i.e., the
economy) and b (i.e., a noneconomic issue), that might in-
fluence voters’ choices. We assume that the payoff of party i
is determined by its expected vote share, vi, which for each i,
j ∈ f1; 2g with j ≠ i is given by
vi p sapai (x
a
i ; x
a
j )1 s
bpbi (x
b
i ; x
b
j ); ð1Þ
where for each k ∈ fa; bg, pki is a Tullock function (Corchón
2007; Tullock 1980) of the form
pki (x
k
i ; x
k
j )p
(
(cki x
k
i )
e
(cki x
k
i )
e 1 (ckj x
k
j )
e if x
k
i 1 0 and x
k
i 1 0
1
2
otherwise
: ð2Þ
Vote shares are determined as follows: sa and sb denote the
salience of issues a and b in public opinion, respectively.
We assume that sa 1 sb p 1, so the salience of an issue can
be interpreted as the probability with which a voter will vote
on the basis of that issue. We denote the electoral return of
party i on issue k ∈ fa; bg by pki (xki ; xkj ). Since pki (xki ; xkj )1
pkj (x
k
j ; x
k
i )p 1, the electoral return of party i on issue k can be
interpreted as the probability that a voter will vote for party i
conditional on voting on the basis of issue k. So vi is indeed
the expected vote share for party i.
The electoral return of party i on issue k is determined
by xki and x
k
j , which denote the degree to which parties i
and j highlight issue k, respectively. For party i, xki can, for
example, be interpreted as the fraction of time devoted to
discussing issue k in parliamentary discussions. So for each
party i, we assume that xai 1 x
b
i p 1. That is, when there are
only two issues, whatever fraction of time is not devoted to
discussing issue a is devoted to discussing issue b. Further-
more, the electoral return of party i on issue k is also pa-
rametrized by cki and c
k
j , which denote the competence of
parties i and j on issue k. With only two parties, we assume for
simplicity that cki 1 c
k
j p 1, so c
k
i is in fact the relative com-
petence of party i on issue k, with cki 1 1=2 indicating that
party i is relatively more competent on issue k than party j
and vice versa. Competence here does not refer to public per-
ceptions of competence, which could be endogenous to party
preference, but to some form of economic competence exog-enous to partisan biases (i.e., objective macroeconomic fluc-
tuations). It is also reasonable to expect that parties focus on
hard economic indicators to infer their own credibility on the
issue of the economy. Finally, the electoral return of party i
on issue k also depends on e ∈ ½0; 1, which captures how
distant one is (in time) from the electoral cycle. For the sake of
simplicity in this model, we assume that the electoral cycle
variable can only have two values (far from election time, and
close to the next election). The empirical analysis, however,
will test our expectations using a more realistic continuous
measure of time.
To give a sense of how the value of this electoral return
function varies with its parameters, consider the extreme case
in which ep 0. Then, regardless of how much parties choose
to highlight issue k, and regardless of their relative compe-
tence on issue k, the electoral return of each party is 1/2. But,
as e increases (closer to election time), the issue highlighting
choices and the relative competences of the parties start to
matter in determining parties’ electoral returns. The param-
eter e thus captures the intuition that voters are probably
myopic and that their voting choices are more likely to be
influenced by the parties’ strategies closer to election time.
Finally, note that for any e 1 0, the electoral return of party i
on issue k is increasing in the degree to which i chooses to
highlight issue k and is increasing in i’s competence on issue k,
but the effect of increasing the degree to which i chooses to
highlight issue k when i’s competence on issue k is low is
smaller than if i’s competence on issue k were high.2 Finally,
note that if both parties choose to not highlight issue k at all
(so xki p x
k
j p 0), then the electoral return of any party on
this issue is 1/2. While the results of the model are particularly
sensitive to this assumption, we believe it is a reasonable one.
If parties decide not to talk at all about any issue, the result
of the election will be based on non-issue-based calculations
like partisanship or the mobilization of its own social con-
stituency. Assuming that parties 1 and 2 are equally main-
stream and with comparable partisan and social bases in the
party system, we assume that avoiding issue-based competi-
tion will benefit parties half of the time.
The model
Given our assumptions above, we can simplify the notation
by letting sp sa (so 12 sp sb). Similarly, let xi p xai and
suppose xi ∈ f0; 1g for i ∈ f1; 2g, and let ck p ck2 for
Volume 81 Number 2 April 2019 / 445k ∈ fa; bg (so that c k represents the relative competence of
the government party on issue k), and finally suppose that
e ∈ f0; 1g.
Suppose that the game is sequential: the opposition party
chooses x1, and the incumbent observes the opposition’s
choice and subsequently chooses x2. When modeling a par-
liamentary exchange, it is reasonable to expect an iterative
dialogue in which the two main parties do not speak at the
same time. The idea of a sequential game in which the op-
position tends to open question-and-answer time and is less
constrained by real world events is compatible with extant em-
pirical research on government opposition dynamics (Pardos-
Prado and Sagarzazu 2016; Seeberg 2013). The game tree is
represented in figure 1, and the payoffs in figures 1A and
1B are obtained by substituting for the appropriate values in
equations (1) and (2).3. Suppose that if s 1 1=2, party 2 chooses x2 p 1 regardless of what
party 1 does, and party 1 chooses x1 p 1.
4. The incumbent has a relatively high effective competence on issue b
whenever cb ≥ (1=2)½(12 2s)=(12 s)1 ½s=(12 s)ca.Propositions
We are now able to characterize the subgame perfect equi-
libriums of this game. We say that the government party
(party 2) has high effective competence relative to the oppo-
sition party (party 1) on issue a if
ca ≥ 1
2
12 s
s
;
and we say that the government party has high effective
competence relative to the opposition party on issue b if
cb ≥ 1
2
s
12 s
:Proposition 1. When ep 0, the parties highlight the
issue that is most salient in public opinion.3 And, when
ep 1,
1. If the government party has high effective com-
petence on all issues, then that party chooses to
highlight whichever issue the opposition chooses
to highlight, and the opposition chooses to high-
light the issue for which the government has a
relatively lower effective competence.4
2. If the government party has high effective com-
petence on one issue but not the other, then it
chooses to highlight the issue that the party is
most effectively competent at, and the opposition
party chooses to highlight the most salient issue
in public opinion.
3. If the government has low effective competence
on all issues, then the government chooses to
highlight whichever issue the opposition does not
highlight, and the opposition chooses to highlight
the most salient issue.
The novel contribution of our model lies in proposi-
tion 1.1, which will be the main object of our empirical
analysis. The remarkable aspect of this proposition is thatFigure 1. Extensive form representation of the game for ep 0 (A) and ep 1 (B)
5. During these four periods both PP and PSOE were able to govern
without the need of any coalition partner.
6. Table 7 in app. 4 (apps. 1–4 are available online) shows descriptive
statistics of all our dependent and independent variables.
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lif the government party has high effective competence on all
issues, then both the opposition and the incumbent party
choose to highlight the same issue regardless of its salience
in public opinion. That is, public opinion is essentially ignored
as the electoral cycle goes by. When ep 0, the comparisons
are trivial since parties will tend to highlight the issue that
is more salient in the public. The results stated in the above
proposition for ep 1 are shown in figure 2. We represent the
choices of the government in paired numbered plots, with
say 0,1 indicating that the incumbent chooses to not highlight
issue a if the opposition does but to highlight issue a if the
opposition does not. The choices of the opposition are repre-
sented in the innermost single-numbered plots. For exam-
ple, in figure 2A, the top-right corner is the one in which the
government has high effective competence over both issues.
However, that area is segmented by a diagonal line into two
areas, with the one on the left representing the area in which
the government is relatively less effectively competent in issue
a. In that area, we have that the government party chooses
to highlight issue a if the opposition highlights issue a, and
the government chooses to highlight issue b if the opposi-
tion chooses to highlight issue b (indeed the choice of the
incumbent in that area is given by 1,0). Furthermore, in that
area, the opposition chooses to highlight issue a (represented
by the 1), which is the issue at which the government is rel-
atively less effectively competent. A similar situation arises
in the top-right corner of figure 2B, which thus shows that
the choice of issue to highlight does not depend on the salience
of the issue in public opinion.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Spain: A bipartisan multiparty system
We test our argument by using data from Spain. Although
Spain has a multiparty system, it has functioned with a bi-
partisan government dynamic until recently, where two majorparties have alternated power in single-party governments
Even if the relative majorities of the governing parties and the
need for agreements with a third (mainly nationalist) party
have varied, the relatively small district magnitude and high
concentration of executive power in the Spanish political sys-
tem explain the prominence of the two main central parties
The electoral system is a standard proportional closed-party
list where members of parliament have very little autonomy
and incentives to challenge the party elite on the floor. This
case study is thus particularly suited to the assumptions un-
derpinning our model: two main competing and office-seeking
parties relatively free from intraparty politics and coalition
compromises. This is not to say that Spain is a unique case
however. Spain is a proportional multiparty parliamentary de-
mocracy with a pattern of government alternation and par-
liamentary structure highly comparable to other Western de-
mocracies. In fact, the Spanish case provides a particularly
good compromise between our model assumptions and a
reasonable level of external validity.
The time span of our analysis, from 1996 to 2011, covers
these dynamics by including four governments, two led by
the right-wing Partido Popular (PP) and the other two led
by the left-wing Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE).5
Furthermore, these four periods include varying macroeco-
nomic conditions that span relative economic strength to
being one of the hardest hit democracies during the globa
economic meltdown that started at the end of last decade.
Party questioning of government
Party issue attention is our dependent variable and refers to xki
and xkj in our model.
6 In order to measure issue attentionFigure 2. Characterization of the equilibriums of the game for ep 1. A, Game when s 1 1=2. B, Game when s ! 1=2
7. For details on the process of converting questions to valid measures
of attention, see app. 1.
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.by the two major Spanish parties, we rely on the questions
made by party members in the plenary sessions of the Spanish
Parliament and aggregate our measures at the month level
(like the rest of our variables). As discussed above, parlia-
mentary appearances have been proved to correlate highly
with party messages from external sources of communication
like the media (Christiansen and Seeberg 2016). In most
plenary sessions (plenos in Spanish), there is a section where
different members of parliament can question the govern-
ment representatives who are present. Exchanges between
legislators in plenary sessions have been used frequently in
political science literature; uses range from ideological posi-
tion estimates to understanding a given party’s attention to
specific issues (see, e.g., Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010;
Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016; Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu
2016; Sagarzazu and Klüver 2017; Slapin and Proksch 2014;
Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011).
Publicly available plenary debates data were obtained from
the Spanish Parliament. We restrict our sample to the data
points with valid observations in all our independent vari-
ables. Table 1 shows the total number of plenary sessions in
which questions were asked in our sample. It also shows the
average number of questions asked in each session by each of
the two main parties and the total number of questions asked
per legislature, by party.
The data show that the parliamentary debate is domi-
nated by the two largest parties, the PP and the PSOE. On
average, both parties have a similar number of interactions
per plenary, regardless of their role as government or op-
position. The last legislature (2008–11) when the PSOE was in
power saw a big drop in the number of sessions with questions
and in the number of questions (especially by the PSOE). This
behavior is consistent with the mechanisms of agenda control
implemented by the PSOE to minimize its exposure due to
the financial crisis. It is important to note, however, that this
circumstance should go against our claim that government
and opposition can ultimately engage in dialogue rather than
in selective issue emphasis. Moreover, the analyses below showthat the last electoral cycle has not biased our findings in any
way. We use parliamentary questions as the input data for the
quantitative text analysis algorithm. The output of this pro-
cess measures attention by the different parties to seven dif-
ferent issues, of which we will solely focus on the economy
Using this mechanism, we classify each word as pertaining to
the economy (1) or not (0) and aggregate words for parties at
the monthly level. As not all parties are allotted equal time
we generate comparable measures by dividing the number o
words on the economy over the total number of words in the
month. As such our dependent variable is the percentage o
words on the economy by a party in a given month.7
In order to illustrate how issue attention varied over the
course of the four legislative terms, figure 3 plots the attention
that the PSOE and the PP paid to the economy as a propor-
tion of the total time the party spoke. This figure shows two
interesting dynamics that occur in the four legislatures. First
a similar attention dynamic can be found in the sixth and
eighth legislatures (legislative sessions are identified in roman
numerals), in which we see no major differences between the
parties. These legislatures are similar not only in the attention
paid to the economy by both parties but also in the fact that
they were the result of a change in control of parliament and
ended in a reelection of the governing party. The second dy-
namic can be seen in the other two legislatures plots in figure 3
in which we see more attention paid to the economy by the
opposition party (i.e., PSOE in the seventh legislature and
PP ninth legislature). While the dominance of the PSOE is
clearer in the seventh legislature than the PP’s dominance in
the ninth legislature, the overall pattern is present throughoutIndependent variables
To test the theories explained in the previous section, we col-
lected data on the economy, public opinion, and the media.Table 1. Average Number of Questions Asked in Plenary Sessions and Total per LegislatureLegislature No. Plenary SessionsPP PSOE OthersAverage Total Average Total Average Total6 (1996–2000) 72 9 612 9 638 4 277
7 (2000–2004) 66 10 800 8 660 4 342
8 (2004–2008) 56 8 683 8 680 6 437
9 (2008–2011) 9 9 260 4 112 4 108Note. PP p Partido Popular; PSOE p Partido Socialista Obrero Español.
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refers to cki and c
k
j in our model. We rely on the tradition of
issue ownership studies analyzing party emphasis as units of
analysis, in which economic reputation is directly inferred
from macroeconomic conditions (Vavreck 2007). Even if per-
ceptions of party competence are partly driven by economic
shocks (Green and Jennings 2017b), this does not mean that we
assume macroeconomic conditions to perfectly reflect voter
perceptions. Since our focus is party strategy, however, it is rea-
sonable to expect parties to use fluctuations in the real econ-
omy as a heuristic to infer their reputation and not use aggregate
measures of party competence that are scarcely available in
Spanish public opinion surveys. Economic data were obtained
from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica data sets (http://
www.ine.es/); specifically, we use the indicators for monthly
unemployment and gross domestic product (GDP) growth.8
Public opinion. Public opinion refers to sa in our model. Public
opinion data were obtained from monthly surveys conducted
by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas (CIS) in Spain.
The CIS conducts monthly public opinion polls together with
many other types of surveys in Spain.9 Each of the monthly8. GDP data are only collected every three months, but we have im-
puted missing values with unemployment, inflation, party and media at-
tention, economic perceptions, and time trends using multiple imputation
procedures in Stata 14 (setting the random seed generator number to 100).
Tables 13 and 14 in app. 3 show how the results in the following section
do not substantially change if GDP growth is excluded from the analyses.
9. Technical documentation and sampling procedures of each survey
can be found at http://www.cis.es.barometers contains a random sample of the Spanish popula-
tion with valid answers to our dependent variable (sample size
varies between 2,376 and 4,874 individuals).
To measure the degree of public attention to the economy,
we used the most important problem (MIP) question. Spe-
cifically, we use the share of respondents concerned about the
economy as a proxy for public opinion saliency of this topic.
As highlighted in previous work, MIP measures might reflect
not only salience but also considerations of the economy as
a problem. Both interpretations of MIP questions would be
consistent with the mechanisms we intend to test (i.e., whether
parties respond to public attention, salience, or concern over
the economy). While we recognize the attention scholars are
raising to the difference between the MIP and the most im-
portant issue (Wlezien 2005), it is also true that these measures
“mostly tap the same things” (Jennings and Wlezien 2011, 554).
In order to strengthen our MIP measure as the potential
effect of saliency net of other problem-based views on the
economy, we control for the current and lagged assessment
of the national state of the economy. The wording of the
question is “With regards to the general economic situation
in Spain, how would you assess it?” The possible answers are
“very good,” “good,” “neither good nor bad,” “bad,” and “very
bad.”10Figure 3. Issue attention over time. PP p Partido Popular; PSOE p Partido Socialista Obrero Español10. This variable has a moderately high correlation with the retrospective
economic evaluations question, which was asked in only 58 surveys (r p :42,
pp :000). Furthermore, when running a factor and a principal components
analysis, both items clearly load on the same dimension, with factor loadings
of 0.54 and 0.71, respectively.
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agenda-setting capabilities. While some have suggested that
the media exerts a great deal of influence (Baumgartner et al.
1997; Chaqués-Bonafont and Baumgartner 2013; Soroka 2002;
Van Aelst and Vliegenthart 2014; Vliegenthart and Walgrave
2011), others find little to no impact (Wanta and Foote 1994)
or that influence is conditioned by system characteristics (Vlie-
genthart et al. 2016).11 Data on media attention were obtained
from the Policy Agendas Project (Chaqués-Bonafont et al.
2014), which coded the front page of the two most important
Spanish newspapers El Mundo and El Pais for the presence
of stories on 21 topic areas. As our interest is stories about
the economy, we aggregated their data and estimated the pro-
portion of news stories on the economy over the total number
of stories for each month in the data set. The result of this
aggregation is a time series of overall coverage on the economy
by the two main Spanish newspapers.
Modeling strategy. Our modeling strategy relies on both
parametric and semiparametric time series analyses. For the
parametric analyses, we model our expectations with auto-
regressive distributed lag (ADL) models. The advantage of
this conventional modeling strategy (which is mathematically
equivalent to error correction models; De Boef and Keele
2008) is that we can estimate both the short-term and long-
term effects of our covariates of interest. Given our theoretical
focus on the electoral cycle, we prefer to be agnostic about the
possible effects of our potential confounders over time. This is
why, following previous research, we chose a conservative and
unrestricted version of ADL models including the contem-
poraneous and lagged versions of our independent variables.
Our interactions with electoral cycle are measured at t 2 1,
to strengthen the plausibility of a causal effect whereby
parties’ reactions are a function of recent stimuli. Table 21 in
appendix 3, however, shows that our conclusions remain un-
changed if the interactions are specified with the electoral cycle
measured at time t.12
Moreover, our general ADL specification allows us to in-
clude the lagged value of our dependent variable and a time
trend, which are both strong controls to reduce biases linked11. For a comprehensive review, see Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006)
and Walgrave et al. (2008).
12. Figure 1 in app. 2 reports the autocorrelation and partial auto-
correlation functions of our dependent variables of interest (government
and opposition issue attention). These suggest an autoregressive process
with one lag—AR(1)—for both variables. Tables 5 and 6 in app. 2 further
report satisfactory Portmanteau tests concerning the residuals of the models
shown in the next section. In all those models, we can never reject the null
hypothesis that the (1, 2, 3, . . . t) lagged residuals are part of a white noise
process. Given these tests, we did not see the need to include further lags
beyond t 2 1.to serial correlation or unobserved time-dependent variables.
It is important to note, however, that our results remained
unchanged if we do not specify a lagged dependent variable
and a time trend. This reassured us that introducing these
strong controls did not introduce bias into the models.
RESULTS
Table 2 reports two ADL models predicting government and
opposition party attention to the issue of the economy, re-
spectively. More specifically, these models present the direct
effects of the rival party’s attention, macroeconomic fluctua-
tions (unemployment and GDP growth), the share of peo-
ple mentioning the economy as the MIP, the average level
of national economic evaluations, and media attention to the
economy.
The first model in table 2 suggests that the average effects
of the main opposition party, the media, and aggregate pub-
lic concern and dissatisfaction with the economy are not sig-
nificant drivers of government’s attention to the economy.
Only the lagged effect of GDP growth has a highly significant
effect at conventional levels. When calculating the long-term
effect of GDP growth on government’s attention, (b1 1 b2)=
(12 b0), it appears to be very small (bp :0001) but signif-
icant according to a Wald test (pp :03). This finding con-
firms an intuitive expectation of issue ownership theory,
which was also contained in proposition 1.2 in the theoretical
model above: when the economy grows, incumbents feel that
their economic credibility increases and subsequently tend to
focus more on the economy.
The final column in table 2 replicates the same ADL
model but with opposition party attention to the economy as
the dependent variable. In this case, the effect of contem-
poraneous media attention is very strong and statistically
significant. This suggests that the media and the opposition
tend to highlight economic issues at the same time. If one
assumes that parties see the media as an amplifier of public
opinion concerns, this result is consistent with the predictions
of our model. Even if the analysis of media attention is out
of the scope of our article, table 8 in appendix 3 explores this
relationship further by replicating the same model using me-
dia attention as the dependent variable. In that model, nega-
tive public economic perceptions are the only significant driver
of media attention (bp :03). We have then further explored
this indirect sequence by fitting a model with negative eco-
nomic perceptions as the dependent variable, also in table 8 in
appendix 3. Intuitively, the short-term effect of GDP growth
(bp 2:0001) and the short term (bp :12) and long-term
(bp :02) effects of unemployment appear to be the strong-
est drivers of public evaluations of the national economy. The
interpretation of these findings is an indirect effect of mac-
13. Tables 11 and 12 in app. 3 show the effect of the interactions
between the electoral cycle and macroeconomic indicators and the media.
All results are insignificant, indicating that, as predicted, the electoral cycle
mainly conditions the effect of opposition attention and MIP.
14. Tables 19 and 20 in app. 3 show that our key results in tables 2 and
3 are consistent when controlling for the total attention devoted to the
economy by all parties with parliamentary representation.
15. Table 21 in app. 3 shows that our main conclusions are not sen-
sitive to the specification of the electoral cycle as a contemporaneous or
lagged predictor in the interaction terms. We opted to report the lagged
interactions in the main text, since they are more intuitive from a Granger
causality point of view.
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ory: unemployment and GDP downturns increase negative
evaluations of the economy and media attention, which sub-
sequently increases the opposition attention to the economy as
well.Table 3 reports a set of fully specified ADL models test-
ing the role of the electoral cycle (measured in months, with
higher values representing more proximity to the next elec-
tion), which is our main contribution. Models 1 and 2 analyze
government attention as the dependent variable and test the
interaction of the electoral cycle with opposition attention and
MIP, respectively. Models 3 and 4 replicate the same specifi-
cation but with opposition attention as the dependent vari-
able. If the main theoretical proposition sketched out above is
valid, the pressure exerted by proximity to election day should
increase the incentives of the incumbent to dispute and re-
spond to the opposition’s attacks in order to avoid losing
credibility. As shown in model 1 in table 3, this is indeed the
case. The interaction between lagged opposition party atten-
tion to the economy and the electoral cycle is positive and
significant. All the constitutive and multiplicative terms of the
interaction are strongly significant, and the sign of the mul-
tiplicative term suggests that the tendency of the government
party to respond to opposition messages increases as election
day approaches. But, the interaction with the lagged effect of
public concern over the economy (model 2) has a weaker ef-
fect as the electoral cycle progresses.13 These findings are en-
tirely consistent with proposition 1 above, which predicted
that under the assumption of comparable competence across
issues, the incumbent chooses to highlight whichever issue
the opposition highlights but only at the end of the cycle. Our
proposition also expected the incumbent to be more respon-
sive to saliency in public opinion early in the cycle.14
Table 3 furthermore tests whether the electoral cycle con-
ditions the strategy of opposition parties (models 3 and 4).
In this case, none of the interaction terms are significant.15
The clearest finding regarding the opposition communication
strategy is thus the mediated effect of unemployment increas-
ing the opposition’s attention to the economy via negative
economic evaluations and the media. This finding is in line
with issue ownership theories expecting opposition parties to
focus on economic issues when the economy performs poorly
and at any given time during the electoral cycle. This is also
consistent with our theoretical model above, which expectedTable 2. Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models Predicting
Government and Opposition Economic Attention without
Electoral Cycle InteractionsGovernment
AttentiontOpposition
AttentiontGovernment attentiont . . . .250
. . . (.20)Government attentiont21 .148 2.080
(.10) (.19)Opposition attentiont .072 . . .
(.06) . . .Opposition attentiont21 .009 .376***
(.06) (.11)MIPt .082 2.286
(.17) (.31)MIPt21 .130 .185
(.17) (.32)Unemploymentt .004 .033
(.02) (.03)Unemploymentt21 2.002 2.041
(.02) (.03)GDP growtht 2E205 25E205
(3E205) (5E205)GDP growtht21 .0001*** 7E206
(3E205) (6E205)Economic perceptionst 2.062 2.084
(.06) (.10)Economic perceptionst21 .096* .007
(.05) (.10)Media attentiont 2.217 1.410**
(.39) (.70)Media attentiont21 .147 2.538
(.39) (.73)Time trend 2.001 2.001
(.00) (.00)Constant 2.027 .428**
(.11) (.21)F 3 2
R2 .299 .294
Log likelihood 171.763 110.856
BIC 2274.751 2152.937Note. Standard errors in parentheses. MIP p most important problem;
GDP p gross domestic product; BIC p Bayesian information criterion.
N p 98.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
Table 3. Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models Predicting Government and Opposition Economic Attention
with Electoral Cycle InteractionsGovernment Attentiont Opposition AttentiontModel 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4Government attentiont . . . . . . .2392 .2511
. . . . . . (.204) (.210)Government attentiont21 .0961 .1253 .0659 2.0746
(.100) (.102) (.455) (.196)Opposition attentiont .0570 .0693 . . . . . .
(.056) (.058) . . . . . .Opposition attentiont21 2.3015*** .0306 .3604*** .3562***
(.114) (.061) (.107) (.110)MIPt .0661 .1792 2.3452 2.3417
(.162) (.174) (.328) (.330)MIPt21 .0811 .7257** .1423 2.0156
(.166) (.330) (.326) (.646)Electoral cyclet21 2.0032** .0015* .0019 .0007
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.002)Government attentiont21 # electoral cyclet21 . . . . . . 2.0078 . . .
. . . . . . (.022) . . .Opposition attentiont21 # electoral cyclet21 .0178*** . . . . . . . . .
(.006) . . . . . . . . .MIPt21 # electoral cyclet21 . . . 2.0277** . . . .0073
. . . (.013) . . . (.025)Unemploymentt .0073 .0069 .0319 .0272
(.017) (.018) (.035) (.033)Unemploymentt21 2.0122 2.0078 2.0419 2.0372
(.018) (.018) (.035) (.034)GDP growtht 1E205 1E205 24E205 25E205
(2E205) (2E205) (5E205) (5E205)GDP growtht21 8E205*** 8E205*** 1E205*** 1E205***
(2E205) (2E205) (5E205) (5E205)Economic perceptionst 2.0351 2.0416 2.0741 2.0717
(.054) (.056) (.107) (.107)Economic perceptionst21 .1352** .0972* .0141 .0213
(.052) (.052) (.103) (.101)Media attentiont 2.3498 2.0637 1.3978* 1.4156*
(.373) (.387) (.726) (.720)Media attentiont21 2.0650 .0740 2.4668 2.4632
(.383) (.390) (.738) (.740)Time trend 2.0014* 2.0011 2.0007 2.0006
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)Constant 2.0190 2.0580 .3817* .3703*
(.113) (.116) (.222) (.218)F 3 3 2 2
R2 .377 .338 .303 .303
Log likelihood 177.547 174.570 111.514 111.489
BIC 2277.150 2271.195 2145.083 2145.034Note. Standard errors in parentheses. MIPpmost important problem; GDPp gross domestic product; BICp Bayesian information criterion.Np 98.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
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(i.e., amplified by the media) or the issue for which the in-
cumbent has low competence (i.e., high unemployment and
low growth), both early and late in the cycle. If one accepts
that opposition parties interpret the issues highlighted by the
media as a reflection of public opinion (since, in fact, our anal-
yses show a relationship between negative economic evalua-
tions and media attention), our findings are fully consistent
with our expectations.
Figure 4A illustrates the marginal effect of lagged oppo-
sition attention to the economy on government economic
attention, conditional on time (Brambour, Clark, and Golder
2006). While the marginal effect is negative and significant
at the beginning of the cycle (i.e., opposition party attention
to economic issues tends to depress the attention paid by
the governing party), it becomes positive and significant at the
end of the cycle (i.e., opposition attention increases govern-
ment attention). Figure 4B illustrates the marginal effect of
lagged aggregate MIP on government economic attention. The
effect is positive and significant at the earliest point in the
electoral cycle. However, the positive effect of public opinion
on government economic attention experiences a slight mono-
tonic decline over the electoral cycle, until it simply becomes
statistically insignificant after the first nine months of the new
electoral term (approximately the first parliamentary year of
the new incumbency).
The findings presented in this section are consistent with
the theoretical model described above. Our model predicted
that early in an electoral cycle parties are better off high-
lighting the issue that is salient in public opinion. Our em-
pirical findings confirm that this is true for governing parties,
since public opinion is the only significant driver of govern-
ment discourse at the beginning of the cycle. Even if the im-pact of MIP values on opposition rhetoric is insignificant,
opposition parties talk about the economy when the media
highlights news driven by bad macroeconomic conditions
and public dissatisfaction. If one accepts media attention as
a proxy for issue saliency, it is reasonable to believe that op-
position parties echo negative economic news once these issues
are salient in the public debate. The results shown in table 3
suggest a zero-sum game in which government responsive-
ness cannot be unlimited and tends to be more driven by en-
dogenous party competition dynamics than by public opinion
concerns as the next election comes closer. The results suggest
an intuitive but nuanced story regarding government eco-
nomic responsiveness. While issue ownership or selective issue
emphasis theories rightly predict that parties will not engage
in dialogue and will tend to put forward their agenda inde-
pendent from one other at the beginning of the cycle, issue
dialogue becomes a much more likely outcome as time pro-
gresses.
It is also true, however, that proposition 1.1 in our model
was supposed to be valid when the government party is rel-
atively competent in all issue domains. Our data only have
four electoral cycles and do not allow us to test a four-way
interaction between opposition discourse, economic issues, non-
economic issues, and the electoral cycle. In any case, our
model does not imply that parties are perfectly aware of their
relative competence across issues and party rivals, which ren-
ders the direct empirical test of different scenarios of cross-
issue competence ambiguous. However, our model also does
not pretend to deterministically predict a dynamic empirical
reality in which political actors need to make quick decisions
without perfect information. Both our theory and empirical
analysis still prove the intuition that, under certain conditions,
some parties can engage in a dialogue with their competitorsFigure 4. Marginal effects on government economic attention: A, opposition attention; B, most important problem
Volume 81 Number 2 April 2019 / 453while disregarding public opinion and that this only occurs at
later stages in the electoral cycle.
The appendix shows a myriad of robustness checks and
confirms that our main conclusions are not biased by serial
correlation or nonstationarity concerns.16 The ADL models
specified above include both the lagged dependent variable
and a time trend, but the results are always consistent if these
two terms are removed from the equation (tables 15 and 16
in app. 3). We also replicated our main models with electoral
term fixed effects, showing that our models are robust to
incumbency-specific unobservables and breaks potentially re-
lated to changes in parliamentary mechanics, party popularity,
or discontinuous changes in economic conditions (tables 17
and 18 in app. 3). Even if no observational analysis is immune
to unobserved confounders or reciprocal effects, our findings
are compatible with a Granger causality perspective. While
the lagged predictors of opposition attention affect govern-
ment attention over the cycle, the lagged value of the incum-
bent does not affect the opposition (see tables 2 and 3). Sim-
ilarly, MIP is not a function of lagged government discourse
(table 8 in app. 3). Finally, when modeling nonparametrically
the effects of our key predictors over time, kernel-weighted
local polynomial regressions (app. 4) confirm the increasing
and decreasing effects of opposition attention and MIP on
government economic attention, respectively.
CONCLUSION
Understanding when and why parties decide to talk about
some issues and not others is one of the cornerstones of16. Tables 2 and 3 in app. 2 show the Durbin-Watson statistic, Durbin’s
alternative test, the Breusch-Pagan test, and the Portmanteau Q test for error
autocorrelation relative to all the models reported in this section. While the
Durbin-Watson tests are inconclusive (since they fall within the boundaries
of their respective lower and upper critical values), Durbin’s alternative test
for serial correlation (which we make robust to the violation of the assump-
tion of homoscedasticity) is more reassuring (in all cases but one). If we rely
on the stricter Portmanteau Q test of the model residuals for autocorrelation
beyond order 1, the results are particularly reassuring: in all cases, we fail to
reject the hypothesis that our model residuals are a white noise process. Fi-
nally, the only unsatisfactory results concern the Breusch-Pagan test for the
models predicting opposition attention, since they cannot clearly reject that
the residuals follow a heteroscedastic pattern. Despite this one result not
fitting the overall pattern of normality in the residuals according to the other
tests, our main substantive conclusions regarding the electoral cycle are based
on models predicting government attention, which are entirely satisfactory.
Table 4 in app. 2 reports a series of Dickey-Fuller tests clearly rejecting the null
hypothesis of a unit-root process for government attention to the economy,
opposition attention to the economy, GDP growth, MIP, and media attention.
Only two independent variables marginally failed the test, namely, public
economic evaluations and unemployment. Despite none of these variables
being critical to our conclusions regarding the electoral cycle, tables 9 and 10
in app. 2 satisfactorily replicate our main findings while including the first
difference (i.e., strictly stationary) of those variables in the model.democratic representation. The issue of the economy is par-
ticularly relevant in this respect, given the enormous academic
attention that it has gathered and its remarkable effects on
electoral results. The literature on issue competition has come
up with solid but contradictory theoretical frameworks. While
issue ownership or issue emphasis theories predict that parties
will highlight only those issues that are beneficial to them,
issue dialogue theories predict that under some circumstances
parties will follow public opinion concerns or will respond to
other parties and the media, even on issues that are not par-
ticularly beneficial to them.
In this article we have proposed a model in which parties
expect voters to myopically react to recent events and in which
the cost of the main opponent gaining economic reputation
is perceived to be high as proximity to election day increases.
More specifically, we hypothesized that governing parties are
more likely to respond to public opinion earlier in the election
cycle but that the incentives to respond to opposition attacks
(even at the cost of provisionally ignoring public opinion)
increase as the election approaches. Moreover, our model
revealed that, in a relevant number of scenarios, opposition
parties are better off highlighting salient issues that can harm
the incumbent, at both early and late stages in the electoral
cycle.
Our ADL models empirically confirmed the main intui-
tions of our model and revealed the timeline of issue com-
petition: a rise in unemployment and a decline in GDP growth
increases negative views on the national economy in public
opinion, which increases media attention to the economy.
Subsequently, media economic attention increases the chal-
lenger’s economic attention at any point in the electoral cycle.
Governing parties, however, are more likely to respond to
those uncomfortable opposition attacks only toward the end
of the electoral cycle and to forget public opinion as the pres-
sure from the opposition increases. Our analyses also revealed
small but significant long-term effects of GDP growth increas-
ing government economic attention, which is an intuitive re-
sult consistent with classical issue ownership expectations.
Our findings shed light on some contradictions between
proponents of issue ownership and issue dialogue theories.
Both seem to be conditional on time and on whether a party is
in or out of power. Issue ownership is consistent with the
long-term effect of GDP growth on government attention and
the indirect effect of unemployment and GDP on the oppo-
sition (via negative economic evaluations and the media; Pe-
trocik 1996; Vavreck 2009). However, incumbents have fewer
incentives to engage in endogenous patterns of party com-
petition at the beginning of the cycle (issue ownership), but
they feel a significantly stronger pressure to respond to attacks
as election day approaches (issue dialogue). This confirms the
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dynamics when analyzing policy agendas (Seeberg 2013; The-
sen 2013).
Our findings also highlight a pessimistic outcome for ideal
conceptions of bottom-up processes of representation. Pub-
lic opinion is not a clear driver of opposition parties’ issue
agenda, and it only seems to drive the government’s com-
munication strategy on economic issues at the beginning of
the electoral cycle. This is consistent with the idea that coun-
tries with higher levels of decentralization and devolution (e.g.,
Spain) will experience a weaker link between public opinion
concerns and policy outputs (John, Bevan, and Jennings 2011).
However, our results also point out that the link between pub-
lic opinion and government agendas can weaken even in
countries that have relatively high levels of clarity surround-
ing executive responsibility, few coalition governments, and
a low number of veto players (Bevan and Jennings 2014).
The variability of incentives for parties to follow or ignore
public opinion over a single electoral cycle seems to transcend
some of the static implications of the current literature that
assesses the effect of institutional settings on issue respon-
siveness. Overall, these findings unpack an important mech-
anism whereby office-seeking dynamics may exacerbate the
increasing sense of detachment between some sectors in pub-
lic opinion and mainstream politicians.
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